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Abstract. This paper devises and applies a statistical test for efficient provision of local
public education. The test is based on the "Samuelson condition" of equality between
the sum of marginal rates of substitution and marginal cost. The econometric method is
a micro-based approach to the estimation of the marginal rate of substitution function.
This method accounts for possible "Tiebout bias" caused by the fact that individuals may
choose their school districts in accordance with their tastes for education.

A Test for Efficiency in the Supply of Public Education
Ted Bergstrom, Judy Roberts, Dan Rubinfeld, and Perry Shapiro
1. Introduction
The question of whether governments spend too much or too little has been the subject
of much debate but little econometric testing. This paper conducts an empirical test
of whether local governments spend more or less than a Pareto optimal amount on local
public goods. Our procedure is very simple in principle. We check whether the "Samuelson
first order conditions" (Samuelson, 1954) for efficient provision of public goods are satisfied.
The Samuelson conditions require that the sum of individual marginal rates of substitution
between a public good and the private numeraire equals the marginal cost of the public
good. This condition is necessary for an interior Pareto optimum and in a well-behaved
convex economy is also sufficient.
Theoretical arguments have been made which suggest that the amount of local public
goods provided may be nearly efficient. Some of these arguments depend on the effec-
tiveness of majority voting. Bowen (1943) proposed a model in which the amount spent
on public goods is the median of the quantities desired by voter-taxpayers, where each
voter realizes that in return for the benefits of additional public expenditure, he or she
will have to bear a predetermined share of the extra cost. Bowen showed that if marginal
rates of substitution are symmetrically distributed and public goods are paid for by a
uniform "head tax", then majority rule leads to a Pareto efficient supply of public goods.
Bergstrom (1979) extended the Bowen efficiency theorem to include some cases where
wealth is not symmetrically distributed and where there is a proportional wealth tax. Led-
yard (1983) presented a model in which voters make rational decisions about whether to
vote, candidates choose their positions strategically and political equilibrium is efficient.
A different theoretical case for the efficiency of local public goods supply was inspired by
the work of Tiebout (1956). Tiebout suggested that the competitive forces engendered by
people "voting with their feet" might lead to approximate efficiency. This literature is ably
summarized and criticized by Bewley (1982) and Stiglitz (1982).
There is an interesting literature that argues that local public goods are undersupplied.
Barlow (1970) suggested that the Bowen conditions are typically not satisfied and offered
evidence that in the case of local school expenditures in Michigan, the median quantity
demanded is less than the Pareto optimal amount. Some economists believe that voters
systematically underestimate the benefits of public goods. Galbraith (1958) attributed
this to the effect of private advertising. Downs (1960) argued that because information is
costly and a single voter has a negligible effect on public outcomes, it is rational for voters
to be less than fully informed about the effect of p~ublic goods. This, Downs argues, leads
to a systematic underestimation of benefits, which are poorly understood, relative to tax
costs which are easily understood. Some writers have suggested that local governments
supp~ly too little public goods because there are "spillovers" in benefits from one city to
another. These effects were analyzed by Brazer (1961), Weisbrod (1904), and Williams
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(1966).
Others have made appealing arguments that "too much" is spent. Romer and Rosenthal
(1979), Brennan and Buchanan (1971), Denzau and Mackay (1982), argue that bureaucrats
may manipulate the choices offered to voters in such a way as to lead to greater expen-
diture than the median of the most preferred amounts of voters. Shapiro and Sonstelie
(1982) found evidence to support the hypothesis of bureaucratic manipulation. Stiglitz
(1982) argued that renters' incentives in elections are inconsistent with efficiency. Courant,
Grailich and Rubinfeld (1979) suggested that public employee market power might also
lead to inefficient levels of public provision.
Our test is designed to detect undersupply of the kind described by Barlow or oversup-
ply due to bureaucratic manipulation. Since we deal with consumers' reported preferences
about expenditures in their own cities, we will not be able to detect undersupply or over-
slpply that occurs because people don't know what is good for theni. We will also be
unable to discover whether there is undersupply because of unrewarded spillovers from
one city to another. Furthermore, our results can tell us nothing about whether efficiency
would require a different assignment of people to cities. A test of the type we suggest
can at best only determine whether the existing population of a city could make a Pareto
improvement for its members by increasing or decreasing its public expenditures.
2. Methodology
Suppose that we observe a number of communities (school districts in our case) each of
which supplies a local public good. Consumer i who lives in community j has a marginal
rate of substitution between the public and private goods that is a function of the form
mi= m(AJ, Y, Hi, Zj) (1)
where A3 is the amount of the public good provided in community j, Y is i's disposable
income (consumption of private goods), Hi is a vector of personal characteristics of person
i (such as age, sex, family status, etc.) and Zj is a vector of characteristics of community
j (such as its population, climate, proximity to other cities, etc.).
To make a manageable task of estimating the sum of marginal rates of substitu-
tion, we will have to make some restrictive assumptions about the functional form of
rn(Aj, Y, Hi, Z;). In particular, we assume that individual marginal rate of substitution
functions are of the form:
m(A, ,Yi, H,Z1)=,fi%+i In A; +,2lnYi+Z In ZjkZ+V Hik + Ei. (2)
Let X; denote the column vector (1, ln Ay,ln Y-;,1ai Zy, Hi) of right-hand variables of the
mrs equation. Equation 2 can then be written simply as:
mi= f'X, + e; (3)
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We estimate the marginal rate of substitution function, ?n(Y , A,, H;, Z,), for expen-
ditures on public primary and secondary education in Michigan using a 1978 survey of
Michigan households (see Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979)). Once we have esti-
mates of this function, based on this statewide sample, we can try to predict the sum of
marginal rates of substitution in individual school districts. We can then compare this sim
with the marginal cost of public goods to the school district. If we find that the predicted
sum of marginal rates of substitution in this school district is greater than our estimate of
the marginal cost of schooling to the district, it may be that the district is spending too
little on public goods from the standpoint of efficiency. It might also be the school district
is different in some way that we have not measured from other districts in the state. But
if there is a systematic tendency to undersupply (oversupply) local public education, then
when we compare the predicted sums of marginal rates of substitution to marginal costs
for a large number of school districts we should expect to find that the predicted sums
of marginal rates of substitution on average tend to exceed (fall short of) the estimated
marginal costs of public goods.
From the Courant, Gramlich, Rubinfeld survey, we can calculate respondent i's tax
price, ti. If her home community provided the same amount that she would choose given
her tax price, then each respondent's tax price would be equal to her marginal rate of
substitution, so that m, = ti. We could then estimate the parameters of the marginal
rate of substitution function in equation 4 simply by running a regression in which the
dependent variable is the tax price, t;.
While people may tend to move to communities where the provision of public goods
is in accordance with their tastes, there is no reason to expect unanimous agreement
within communities about expenditure levels. It is true that if people sorted themselves so
that residents of the same community had nearly identical tastes and incomes, then with
an equitable tax structure and a reasonably responsive government, we would expect all
residents to be getting approximately the amount of public goods that they would choose
for themselves given the tax structure. But there are strong economic forces that lead to
diversity within communities. People with different occupational skills find it advantageous
to work together and to live in close proximity. The housing stock may be highly variable
in age, quality, size of units, and attractiveness of location. It is not surprising therefore
that within communities there is a wide range in the incomes, education levels, ages,
and family sizes of residents. While taxes of different types of consumers could possibly
be adjusted to achieve near unanimity about quantities, we cannot expect on a priori
grounds that communities will be in Lindahl equilibrium. And indeed empirically there is
no such near-unanimity. In the Courant, Gramlich, Rubinfeld survey about 25 per cent of
the respondents wanted higher and about 17 percent wanted lower expenditures on public
goods than were currently supplied in their communities.
The fact that community choice is voluntary leads to a potentially important statistical
problem. This problem of "Tiebout bias" (Goldstein and Pauly (1981)) can be described
as follows. Define the variable t9; to be the difference between household i's marginal rate
of substitution and its tax price. Thus we have:
i= m(Ay,,Y, H,,Z,)+ j; (4)
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and therefore from (3) it follows-that
ti= #'X + e; + r1. (5)
If 71i were uncorrelated with variables Xi, then the mismatch between ti and m; would cause
no econometric problems. Then if ei is also uncorrelated with X;, unbiased estimators of
the parameters of equation (5) could be found by ordinary least squares. (One instance
where this would be the case is where rj is zero for all i.) We want to take account of the
possibility that il; is correlated with the right hand variables, X;. For this reason we will
have to use a more elaborate econometric method which is described in the remainder of
this section.
We focus on a survey question in which respondents were asked whether they would pre-
fer school spending to increase, decrease or remain the same, if they knew that their taxes
would change to reflect these expenditure changes. Because the responses take the form of
discrete rather than continuous variables, we must use a qualitative response model. We
postulate that people only say that they are dissatisfied with the current state of affairs
if their tax price is sufficiently different from their marginal rate of substitution, If the
difference is not sufficiently large, they respond that they want local school expenditures
to remain the same (S). If their marginal rate of substitution is sufficiently larger than
their tax price, they respond that they want more expenditures (M) and if it is sufficiently
smaller they respond that they want less (L). The concept of sufficient difference is for-
malized by a parameter 6 such that the response is (M) if rn > ti + 6; (L) if mi < ti - 6;
and (S) if ti -6< mi <ti +6.
Recalling equation 3, we see that the probabilities of individual i's responses conditional
on a tax rate ti and vector of characteristics Xi are:
P(Mi ti,,Xj) = P(e; > ti - 13'X +6)
P(Liti,,X) = P(ei < ti - 13'X - 6)
P(Si|ti, X,) = P(t, - 3'X -6 < E < ti - 'X +6). (6)
Assuming that e has a standard normal distribution, the probabilities can be expressed in
terms of the standard normal cumulative distribution as follows:
i= - /'X +6 - E(eItiXi)
P(ML|ti, Xi ) = t1 - F 3'X-6EtiXi)
P(Lili~xi = P ti - #'X - 6 - E(ecti, X;)
o(elt ;, Xi )
P(SItX, -F ti - 'X±+6- E(e~ti, X) F t2 - I'X-6 -E(e~tiXi)) 7
If e were distributed independently of (ti, Xi), it would be the case that E(e~ti, X;) =0
and standard, ordered probit estimation would yield consistent and efficient estimators
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of the parameters /3 and 6. But we suspect that this is not the case. As we argued in
connection with equation (5), even if we are willing to assume that ei is uncorrelated with
X, by itself, the correlation between ej and t; conditional on Xi will generally be nonzero.
Similarly, since the vector Xi includes as one of its components actual school spending
levels in i's community (in A3), the correlation between e, and Xi given ti is likely to be
nonzero. Failure to recognize these possible correlations can result in what we call Tiebout
bias, or bias that occurs because people take into account their preferences for public goods
when they decide where to live.
To deal with possible correlation between e and (ti, Xi), we introduce a set of in-
strumnental variables which plausibly have a negligible influence on the marginal rate of
substitution functions but which may affect either ti or Ai. In the next section we will
describe these instrumental variables, which are denoted by the vector Wi. Let us define
Xi to be the vector obtained by dropping the component in Ai from the vector Xi. Our
approach is to add two equations to the model, which may themselves be simultaneously
determined. The reduced forms are follows:
i = 6 0+612i + w1  (8)
In A; = 62 1Xi + 92 2 W + W2 i. (9)
where wi and w2 are random errors assumed to be uncorrelated with W and X. We
estimate the system of equations, (7)-(9), using the method of full information maximum
likelihood. The relevant likelihood function is described in the appendix. A detailed
discussion of the approach can be found in Rubinfeld, Shapiro and Roberts (1987).
3. Predicting Individual Marginal Rates of Substitution
Our source of data is a sample of 1093 Michigan homeowners from a survey of Michigan
voters residing in many different school districts. The fact that the sample includes voters
from different school districts is important since we want to estimate the effects of charac-
teristics of the school districts in which a respondent lives as well as the respondent's own
characteristics on her willingness to pay for an additional unit of local public education.
The individual characteristics of the respondents were recorded in the survey. The charac-
teristics of the school systems were obtained from the Michigan Department of Education,
while other community characteristics were taken from the 1970 U.S. Census First Count
and Fourth Count School District data tapes. The definitions of all variables used in the
estimation procedure are given in Table 1.
Measurement of Independent Variables for the Prediction Equations.
The way in which we measure quantity and price variables requires some discussion. The
quantity of local public education that a respondent experiences is measured by per stu-
dent expenditures in the local school district. Per student expenditures by itself is the
appropriate measure if there are constant returns to scale in the production of local ed-
ucation and if the costs of educational inputs are the same across districts. To allow for
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the possibility that there may be increasing or decreasing returns to scale, we included
variables for total enrollment in the school district and average enrollment per school in
the district. If there are increasing (decreasing) returns to scale, then providing an extra
unit of education would be cheaper (more expensive) in larger school districts.
To allow for differences in costs due to differences in the wages paid to teachers, we
included a variable measuring the average teachers' salary in the county where the school
district was located. We used the average teachers' salary for the county in which the
school district was located rather than the average teachers' salary in the district itself
since differences in the latter might be strongly influenced by differences in the quality
and experience of teachers while differences in the former might more closely reflect the
market conditions facing the school district. Not only might the prices of school inputs
differ from district to district, but so might the price of private goods. The average wage
rate of non-teachers is used as a surrogate for a local price index for private goods.1 We
also included as a variable the mean per capita income in the respondents' home county.
Since the commodity of interest is per student school expenditures, the tax price ti
paid by family i is the cost to i of increasing the expenditure per .tiutent in the school
district where the family resides by one dollar. In the survey, each respondent reported
the assessed value of his home. The tax share of respondent i was taken as the ratio of
the assessed value of i's home to the total assessed value of property in i's home district.
This tax share multiplied by the number of students in the district is the tax price, ti.
We do not know much about the tax shares perceived by renters. Therefore we did not
estimate separate marginal rate of substitution functions for renters. Instead we assumed
that renter preferences for public goods were the same as the preferences of homeowners
(though of course their tax prices might be very different). When we later construct
estimates of sums of marginal rates of substitution in the community, we must add in the
estimated sum over renters as well as homeowners.
The respondent's disposable income was recorded from the survey. We included several
other variables that describe individual characteristics which might influence demand. One
variable of interest is whether a respondent has children in the local public schools. We
included separate dummy variables for whether a respondent had children of school age and
for whether a respondent had preschool children. We also include a variable for whether
the respondent has children in private school. Other variables describe the respondent's
race, sex, educational level, and whether the respondent is over 65 years of age, retired,
unemployed, or receiving welfare payments.
We use four instrumental variables which could reasonably be expected to influence a
taxpayer's actual tax price or the local school district's expenditure level but would not
have a direct effect on willingnesses to pay for local public education. The first is the
fraction of households in i's community with income within 3U% of the community median
1 Differences in wages due simply to the occupational mix are excluded since we were able to find
wages by occupation and compute a weighted average using the same weights for each occupation across
communities.
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income. The more homogeneous a population, the more agreement there should be about
the correct level of spending. Furthermore, a person in a homogeneous community is not
as likely as one in a heterogeneous community to have extremely high or low tax shares,
since property values are likely to be more nearly equal. The second instrument is the
percent change in educational expenditures between the fiscal year 1977-78 and 1978-79.
Because moving is costly, households will often choose to remain in a community even
though local spending changes at a different rate than household demand.
The third and fourth instruments are intended to measure the ease of "voting with
one's feet". In urban areas there are many school districts within connuting distance of
one's job. In an isolated community or a rural area there will typically be only one school
district. If the workplace requires diversity of tastes and income, one would expect more
sorting into communities of relatively homogeneous tastes and income in the suburbs than
in isolated communites. We therefore include a dummy variable for whether a respondent
resides in a central city and another dummy for whether the individual resides in an SMSA.
The Prediction Equations for Individuals
We write the equation for predicting the marginal rate of substitution of individual i as:
?=l; = #'X; + 2(ti,Xi, Wi). (10)
where 6i(ti, Xi, W;) is the estimated value of e; conditional on -ti, Xi and Wi. As we show
in the appendix, the expected value of the error term can be written:
E(E;|ti, X;, W,) = ^ytti + 7' Xi + 7',W (11)
Our estimating procedure provides us with unbiased estimators of the -y's so that
(t;, X;, W;) = 'tti; + ' + ''W; (12).
Equation (10) is therefore equivalent to:
71i = tt-+(f' ±"+')X; +W;. (13)
The full information maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of equation (13)
are given in Table 2. Estimates of fi are in column 1 and estimates of y are in column 2.
While the primary purpose of this effort is to provide prediction equations to be used
for other purposes, it is of interest to notice the magnitudes of price and income elastic-
ities that are implicit in the parameter estimates that we use. With convex preferences,
we should expect the marginal rate of substitution between education and other goods to
vary inversely with the amount of public education and directly with disposable income
(since the latter measures expenditures on "other goods"). As can be seen from Table 2,
the estimated effect of household income on marginal rate of substitution was significantly
7
positive and the estimated effect of expenditure on marginal rate of substitution was sig-
nificantly negative. The implied income elasticity of demand based on these estimates is
.23. The implied price elasticity of demand is -.87.2
The reader is free to explore and interpret other coefficients that appear in the table.
The estimates of yt and "A (where yA is the element in the vector 'Yx that is associated with
in A) tell us about the correlation between e and (t, X), which is to say, the importance of
Tiebout sorting. As we demonstrate in the appendix, if there were no correlation between
e and (t, X), then -y, and 7A would both be zero. We find, using asymptotic t-tests, that
both of these coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
In Table 3 we present the maximum likelihood estimates of the marginal rate of sU)sti-
tution function where no correction for Tiebout sorting is made. These estimates constrain
e to be uncorrelated with w1 and w2, the unobserved determinants of tax price and actual
expenditures (that is, yt and yx are constrained to zero). Almost all the coefficients of the
constrained model are substantially larger than those of the general model. The likelihood
ratio test between the constrained and unconstrained models yields a Chi-square(2df) of
8.10. As a result, the hypothesis of zero covariance, or the exogeneity of both expenditures
and tax price, can be rejected at the 1% level.
4. Testing for Efficiency of Community Expenditures
Predicting Community Sums of Marginal Rates of Substitution
Now that we have prediction equations for individual marginal rates of substitution, we
can use these equations, together with information available from the Census about the
distributions of economic and demographic characteristics in school districts, to predict
the sum of marginal rates of substitution in any school district in Michigan. The way
we proceed is as follows. Let Si be the set of households in community j and let mi =
ZiEs; mi. Since Equation (13) is linear in t, X, and W, we can estimate the sum of
marginal rates of substitution as follows:
9 = Z mi = $t' + (/' +' ')X + - WI (14)
ies;
where ti = ZiES ti, Xi = lEs X; and W = Wjj 1.
If we sum the expression in Equation (3) over all consumers in community j, we have
mi = m; = #'X' + E&(15)
iES,
2 'These estimates are obtained b~y solving the equation m = 1 In A +#/2 in Y + constants for in A as
a function of the other variables. When a consumer is getting the desired arnount of public goods, mf is
equal to the price p that he pays for them. Then we have ini A = (p -#g2 hii Y 4constants)/p3i. The income
elasticity is therefore just -#32/1 and the price elasticity evaluated at the mean price is just pi//A. Using
our estimates #1i and #32, we find .23 and - .87 respectively.
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where e' = i e. From adding the expressions in Equation 11, it follows that
E(e'1jt,1X', W') = 'yt t +'yX' + yy4W' . (16)
From Equations (14), (15), and (16) it follows that:
t' -i- = (#' -fp'+E -y'XX+(i( -3g)t' +( , -y' Y)Wo - e +E(E It',X', W'). (17)
For each community, we must find the aggregate vectors, Xj, and W'. Most of the
components of these vectors are aggregates that are readily available in statistics published
by the U.S. Census or the Michigan Department of Education. For example the census
records the number of households in each community, the number of persons over 65 years
of age and the number of persons with a college education.
Calculating the sum of In Y in each community is slightly more difficult. Here the
problem is twofold: the Census reports information on income rather than log of income,
and the form of the information differs between families and unrelated individuals. The
approach we have taken is to estimate the mean of in Y for families from the information
available on family income and the mean of In Y for individuals from the information on
individual income. Weighting these by the number of families and the number of unrelated
individuals, respectively, we obtain the district-wide mean of ln Y. The distribution of
families in a school district was given for fifteen income brackets, allowing us to estimate
the median family income (we assume a uniform distribution within each bracket). Then
assuming income is distributed log-normally, we have, for families,
mean(ln Y) = median(ln Y) = in median(Y).
For unrelated individuals, the only data available were aggregate income and the number
of individuals. For them we took in mean(Y) as an approximation for mfean(ln1 Y).
Efficiency in the Interest of Society as a Whole
Let cj be the marginal cost of providing the local public good to community j. Then the
Samuelson efficiency condition for community j is expressed by the equation
cj = m' = m;=3'X' +.e'. (18)
iESj
In our application the public good is per student expenditures in the local public schools.
The cost to a school district of increasing expenditures per student by one dollar is equal
to the number of students in the district. Therefore c1 is just the number of students
enrolled in school district j. If the only benefits from local schools accrue to people living
in the school district, and if district j spends the efficient amount, then we should have
m/ = 1. For the 497 Michigan school districts, the average ratio of r~ni to c5 is 0.748.
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The distribution of the computed values of the ratio of community mrs to marginal cost
is shown in Figure 1. More than 80% of the school districts have riii/c, < 1.
It is possible to use our estimates to identify school districts for which there is an
especially large divergence between the sum of marginal rates of substitution and marginal
cost. But it is important to remember that for a Particular community, such a divergence
is n9t necessarily an indication of inefficiency. It might be that unobserved differences in
tastes for education or unobserved cost differences account for the discrepancy. In our
notation, this would mean that E3 differs from its expected value.
Although e0 - E(e jIts, X', Wi) will vary across individual districts, we can expect
that the average value of this difference over the 497 school districts in Michigan will be
very close to zero. To test for a systematic tendency for overspending or underspending
in Michigan, we therefore want to study the average over all Michigan school districts
of the ratio rhn/cy. Under the null hypothesis that there is no systematic bias toward




where X = 1 "='" - W = n w and = .- gXW)
nj= =1 c" j1 1c nEj c)
The variance of the expression in Equation (19) comes from two sources. One source
is the variance of the fl's and j's around the "true" /3's and -y's. The second source of
variance is the random variable E. Since E is a mean of statistically independent community
specific random variables taken from 497 communities, the latter source of variance can
reasonably be neglected. As we see from Equation (19), the difference i i- 1 is
a linear combination of the difference between our parameter estimates for the fl's and
-y's and their expected value. Since we have estimates of the variance-covariance matrix
for these estimates, we can readily calculate an estimate of the standard deviation of
the expression in Equation (19). According to our computations, the random variable
1 ZEn m' takes the value .748 and the estimated standard error of this random variable
is .09. Therefore we must reject the hypothesis of efficiency at the 95% significance level.
These results suggest that the sum of marginal rates of substitution between local public
education and other goods in Michigan communities tends to be less than the marginal cost
of public goods. If the only beneficiaries of local public education are the residents of the
community in which the education is provided, this would mean that most communities
spend too much on local public education from the standpoint of social efficiency.
Efficiency in the Interest of the Localities.
There is another way in which the efficiency of local governments could be measured.
Instead of comparing the sum of marginal rates of substitution with the marginal cost of
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local public education, we might compare this sum with the fraction of marginal costs that
are borne by the voters in the school district. This would give us a test of whether school
districts are acting efficiently in the interest of their own residents.
In Michigan, at the time of this survey, marginal increments to local revenue came
from the local property tax. In most school districts a large fraction of the property tax
base is non-residential property and, of course, much of this property is either not locally
owned or concentrated in the hands of a very small number of voters. (For the included
communities non-residential property is 35% of the property tax base.) If people believe
that taxes assessed on non-residential property are fully exported and if the fraction of
the local property tax base that is residential property is s3, then efficiency from a purely
local point of view requires that m/cj = s1.
For 454 of the 497 communities that we observed, - - si is positive and for the
remaining communities ' - si is negative. Under the null hypothesis that, on average,
= si, Equation (19) would be replaced by
- -- = (' +P '^7) + ($7 t)^t +(7' -7)W+(20)
j=1
where 3= n 1Si.
As it turns out, s"= .649 and n_,1 = .748. The estimated standard error of the
random variable - is .09. Therefore we are not able to reject the hypothesis
that, on average, - . = si.
5. Concluding Remarks.
This is, as far as we know, the first attempt in the literature to empirically test the
Samuelson conditions for efficient provision of public goods. Accordingly, we urge the
readers to interpret our results cautiously. Other data sources and other methods of
approach may lead to very different conclusions. To illustrate this point, we must point
out that our corrections for Tiebout bias had a very strong effect on our results. If we
estimate the marginal rate of substitution functions, making no correction for Tiebout
bias, but otherwise pursuing the same methods, we find that the average value of the ratio
of summed marginal rates of substitution to marginal cost in Michigan school districts is
1.62 while with the correction, the average value is 0.748. Thus the uncorrected estimates
would suggest substantial underspending and the corrected estimates suggest a tendency
toward overspending.
The choice of which variables to treat as endogenous also makes a difference, albeit a
smaller difference, to the efficiency calculation. When the endogeneity correction is applied
only to expenditures, and not to price, the average ratio of summed mrs to marginal cost
is about .94. However, when the endogenity correction is applied to tax price alone, the
X1
resulting efficiency calculation is .80, much closer to the result of applying the endogeneity
correction to both variables.
These facts suggest that if someone wants to prove either that too much or too little is
being spent, he can find the desired result by fiddling with the specification of the model.
We think that the correction we have chosen is preferable on theoretical grounds to the
uncorrected estimates. Other data sets and other choices of instrumental variables may
lead to different conclusions. But if there is a strong tendency in one direction or another,
we expect that it would be confirmed in repeated studies. We hope that others will try to
investigate this question empirically.
With these qualifications in mind, suppose we take our empirical results as roughly
correct, what conclusions could we draw? On average it appears that the sum of marginal
rates of substitution for local public education is lower than marginal cost. If there are no
spillovers of benefits from one school district to others, this would mean that local school
districts are overspending from the standpoint of social efficiency. But, on average, the
sum of the residents' marginal rates of substitution is about equal to the share of the costs
that are borne by local taxpayers. This means that local school districts tend to act quite
efficiently in promoting the interests of the voting population which does not bear the
entire cost of local education. Whether this is a socially efficient arrangement depends on
the size of the externalities generated by local education for the rest of the economy.
So, even if our empirical results were unquestioned, we wouldn't have ended the debate
on whether too much or too little is being spent. Whether or not the expenditure level is
efficient from the viewpoint of society as a whole it would be of considerable interest if our
conclusion that local school districts tend to act efficiently in the interests of local voters
is corroborated by other research.
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Appendix
The system of equations 3, 8, and 9 in the text is assumed to have a vector of random
disturbances (e, wi ,w2) with a joint normal distribution with mean zero and with off-
diagonal covariances that are not necessarily zero. It is the fact that these off-diagonal
terms, owl,, cw 2 , and aw 1 w2 are non-zero that causes Tiebout bias to be a problem.
A full information maximum likelihood procedure is used to obtain consistent parameter
estimates. Letting R represent an individual's more/same/less response, the likelihood
function that is maximized represents the joint probability of observing the given set of
(R, t, ln A) vectors. For example, given X0 and Wo, the likelihood of observing a "more"
response, tax price to, and expenditure level, Ao is:
pr(more, to,in Ao) = If(e, wo, w2o)de
to ta--pXo
where w1 = to - 6111o - 91 2Wo and w20 = In Ao - 021Io - 62 2W0 . Using Bayes' law,
f(e,wi, w2 ) = f(EIt,w2)f(wi,w 2) = f(eIwi,w 2 )f(wmI 2 )f(w 2 ).
And, from standard results for conditional distributions of multivariate normal variables,
E(Ejwio, w2o) = Aiw 10 + \ 2 w20 and E(wiolw2o) = A3w20 where
2
to -# Xo+ W1 - E0 io - m2 1 2




Then the term in the likelihood function corresponding to this observation is
(we- - 1 2)
(2i 0 - Asw 2o w22
In 1 - F -1W22 (n2 7rw . n2oW
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In a similar fashion, the likelihood function for the entire sample becomes
L = In F t #X -6-hu-k2
iELess ln EW1A,w2
+ In F t - p'Xi + 6-Aiw 2 w 2  F t- X -6- A 1W A2w2
iE-SaFme o|ww,2 w2  22)))
+ - F (t 1 - IJIXi+±6- li- A 2 W2 :)+ In 1 -  A -e
iE More 0 1 (I 2lw
n 2(wu
1 -A 3 2i)2 ii- t(ln 27rcT1 I 2 + In 27r22) - -2 2 Z
Substituting w12 = ti - 61X; - 0 12 Wi and w2 i = in A -621Xi) - 022W , we maximize
this function with respect to fi, 6, 8, A1, A2 , A3, 0eWi,w 2 ,W2,W1 , and uw2.
We are concerned here, however, with predicting marginal rates of substitution, rather
than with estimates of the structural model. That is, we are concerned with
m = 3'X + A1(t - 8n1XC-- 912W) + A2 (lnA - 02X - 022W).
Gathering terms and making obvious substitutions, we can write
ml = -'X±+ ygt t'7X + 'wW.
These are the reduced form parameter estimates fi and y that are reported in Table 2.
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Individual 's tax price
Log of actual per pupil school expenditures
Log of household disposable income
Dummy variable: 1 if black, 0 otherwise
Number of children younger than six years old






1 if child in private school, 0
if a college graduate, 0 otherwise















retired or disables, 0 otherwise
over age 65, 0 otherwise
unemployed, 0 otherwise
if receives transfer payments, 0
Log of total school district enrollment
Log of number of students per school
Dummy variable: 1 if resident of Detroit, 0 otherwise
Log of county average teachers' salary
Log of county average income
Log of county average wage rate
Dummy variable: I if in SMSA, 0 otherwise
Dummy variable: 1 if in central city, @ otherwise
Percent change in school district expenditures per
pupil over the previous year
Fraction of households with income within 30 percent of
district median income
TABLE 2























































































































Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
TABLE 3
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